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Interlocutors converge on names to refer to entities. For
example, a speaker might refer to a novel looking object as
the jellyfish and, once identified, the listener will too. The
hypothesized mechanism behind such referential precedents is
a subject of debate. The common ground view claims that
listeners register the object as well as the identity of the speaker
who coined the label. The linguistic view claims that, once
established, precedents are treated by listeners like any other
linguistic unit, i.e. without needing to keep track of the speaker.
To test predictions from each account, we used visual-world
eyetracking, which allows observations in real time, during a
standard referential communication task. Participants had to
select objects based on instructions from two speakers. In the
critical condition, listeners sought an object with a negative
reference such as not the jellyfish. We aimed to determine
the extent to which listeners rely on the linguistic input,
common ground or both. We found that initial interpretations
were based on linguistic processing only and that common
ground considerations do emerge but only after 1000 ms. Our
findings support the idea that—at least temporally—linguistic
processing can be isolated from common ground.
1. Introduction
When a mother glances at her son, says ‘Look’ and points ahead,
she expects her son to understand that her intention was to
2017 The Authors. Published by the Royal Society under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/, which permits unrestricted
use, provided the original author and source are credited.
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guide his sight to, let us say, a spectacular full moon on the horizon; likewise, the son needs to work
out that the mother’s intention was for him to notice the moon. Reference resolution is arguably one of
the most basic of pragmatic acts and so referential phenomena fit well within an ostensive-inferential
framework of communication as first conceived by Paul Grice [1], according to which the linguistically
encoded meaning of an utterance is just part of the listener’s effort to understand the speaker’s intention.
Reference resolution comes in various forms. When it involves pointing, the observer needs to
distinguish the indicated object from countless possibilities and understand precisely what is the
pointer’s purpose [2]. When identifying an object, e.g. as the small cup, the speaker is also potentially
providing a listener with a means to distinguish that object from other similar ones, i.e. non-small
cups [3,4]. When a speaker labels an atypical object as the jellyfish it is a way for him to have common
vocabulary with his listener [5,6]. What ties these examples together is that all of them call on some
amount of intention reading. The related question in the experimental literature is, how much is common
ground, which comprises the set of beliefs, assumptions and suppositions that interlocutors share and
know that they share [7], implicated in reference resolution?
In what follows, we will describe in greater detail one of the referential phenomena described above—
precedent uses (as in the example above concerning the jellyfish). We will then present two opposing
points of view about the way it works. Briefly, one school of thought, starting with Clark [8], is that
a listener should comprehensively and automatically incorporate features of common ground when
resolving reference. Another school, starting with Keysar and co-workers [9,10], defends a minimalist
position which says that the referential utterance may be a starting point for listeners to access features of
common ground but it may not even be called upon nor be necessary. The intense exchange between the
two sides has allowed researchers to sharpen their collective vision about the way referential resolution
is carried out. We then turn to our experiment which aims to determine—in a finely tuned eye-tracking
paradigm—the point at which intentional factors, such as common ground, come into play in the
resolution of re-used referents.
1.1. Precedents and speaker consistency
When speakers introduce a referent into discourse, their description establishes a referential precedent
that interlocutors tend to follow subsequently [5,6]. For example, Brennan & Clark [11] showed that
speakers who have referred to a particular couch as the old couch tend to continue to refer to it that
way, even when a change in the context makes the description overly specific (e.g. when it becomes
the only couch in question). Maintaining consistency helps interlocutors assign reference and to such an
extent that it often overrides the goal of providing listeners with optimally informative descriptions in
the immediate context. This consistency arguably reduces ambiguity in conversation and is found even
among 3–5-year-old children [12,13]. A wide range of studies has now shown that listeners are able to
exploit this collaborative consistency [9,14–19].
Despite consensus around the idea that comprehension is guided by referential precedents, there
has been considerable debate over the nature of this guidance. According to Brennan and colleagues,
referring precedents reflect conceptual pacts, which are mutually accepted agreements between specific
interlocutors [11,17]. When a speaker chooses a particular way of conceptualizing and describing a
referent, she does it in a way that facilitates a listener’s interpretation; and when a listener (tacitly)
accepts this description, the link between the conceptualization and the referent becomes part of their
common ground. Thus, the influence of referential precedents on interpretation arises from two key
aspects of a dialogue: the dynamics of collaboration, through which interlocutors strive to mutually
facilitate comprehension by making their contribution as easy as possible to interpret, and common
ground, a set of shared assumptions or shared knowledge that arises through joint actions [20,21].
This view predicts that precedents established between the listener and only one interlocutor ought
to influence the listener when identifying referents, either completely or partially [14,17]. This means
that efficient reference resolution will directly depend on the identity of the speaker. This has led to
two predictions. The first is that a speaker’s identity and common ground ought to matter when a
speaker, in a one-on-one conversation, employs a second expression to describe a previously named
object. Concretely, a speaker who changes the name of a previously named referent ought to prompt
consternation from a listener; meanwhile, a newly arriving speaker who comes up with a new name
for an object that was previously named by another interlocutor ought not to surprise the listener. For
example, if a speaker A named a novel-looking object as ‘the upside-down funnel’, the listener should
be surprised if that speaker does not re-use the expression to refer to it again, using instead ‘the black
vase’. This surprise should not happen if a new speaker (B) uses that new expression to refer to the same
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object. The second, related prediction is that a listener should benefit—mainly by facilitating reference
resolution—from a speaker when she re-uses an expression to refer to an object; moreover, this benefit
should be less if a second interlocutor, who is naive to a pair’s prior conversation, were to coincidentally
refer to a previously named object by using the same expression that was established by the original pair.
In an influential paper, Metzing & Brennan [17] tested the first prediction by tracking participants’ eye
movements as they followed directions from a confederate speaker in order to select one object among
several. The authors found that when the speaker uses a new expression to identify a previously named
item, i.e. the intended object, participants take longer to select it, even if it is the one that best fits the
description. Importantly, this delay only occurs when the previous name was a precedent in common
ground with that speaker. That is, when a new, naive interlocutor applies that new expression to identify
a previously named item (the one that had been assigned a name through common ground with another
speaker), there is no apparent delay in selecting the object that best fits the description.
Recent work, however, questions both claims derived from this view. With respect to the first
prediction, Kronmüller & Barr [19] conducted a meta-analysis of 10 experiments that used a similar
paradigm and found that listeners do momentarily look away from an object that already has a name
attached to it, no matter who did the naming. Experimental work does not support entirely the second
prediction either. Established precedents that are repeated by someone other than the initial speaker
appear to be understood as readily as those that come from the one who originally coined the referent
[9,17]; there is a short-lived facilitation with the original speaker, but that facilitation fades away quickly
after its appearance [14,22]. A new speaker could use a previously used expression and the listener
would hardly notice nor will it have a strong influence on comprehension. Therefore, there is evidence
that any available precedent that listeners establish with a previous speaker will influence performance in
a reference-naming task. In their meta-analysis, Kronmüller and Barr also found that the comprehension
of precedents is largely speaker-independent; that is, reference-comprehension is not steadfastly linked
to shared information between a speaker and a listener.
This leads to an alternative view according to which re-used expressions are best viewed as linguistic
expressions that have no immediate recourse to the identity of the speaker and, it follows, to common
ground. This explanation is in line with accounts of egocentrism that have been documented widely
in the literature [10,23], according to which interlocutors are harboured to their own perspective and
do not readily consider their interlocutor’s (also see Hanna et al. [24]). For example, when a participant
sees three differently sized candles with only the smallest outside the speaker’s purview and then hears a
speaker say ‘take the small candle and . . .’, the participant usually looks at or even moves the smallest one
anyway. The experimental case of precedent use indicates that the extraction of a more comprehensive
intentionally rich meaning, one that incorporates concerns about common ground, is not automatic. This
is consistent with the account by Grice [1], who pointed to a gap between the processing of linguistic
meaning and a fully formed intentional one.
1.2. Our approach: the current study
We propose that a referential precedent, even a newly coined one, can be viewed practically as a
linguistic unit. Like in any utterance, linguistic meanings have a role to play in a listener’s effort to
work out the speaker’s intention. It follows that features like common ground have an important role
to play, too. However, this should not be taken to mean that participants in referential paradigms
always need to fully consider pragmatic features, such as speaker identity and common ground. The
question we pursue here is, when does common ground come into play? The strong position would
argue that common ground’s role is immediate and that common ground features (concerning the
speaker’s identity) are part and parcel of referential expression [14,21,25]. According to our approach,
linguistic expressions are the basis for eventually working out the speaker’s intention. This leads to
two possible outcomes. Either participants stick with the linguistic meaning and fail to fully engage
common ground features or they process the linguistic meaning and eventually bring common ground
features into consideration. Either way, one should see evidence showing that a reading based on
an utterance’s linguistic meaning can be isolated from a reading that takes full advantage of its
pragmatic potential.
To create this diagnostic study, we adapted the now classic paradigm known as Referential
Communication Game [5,26], in which novel-looking objects are given original names by a speaker
(known as a Director in the prior studies). Participants see several novel-looking objects on a computer
screen and are asked by a live confederate, for example, to ‘click on (the one that looks like) the jellyfish’.
To introduce a new speaker into the scenario, another interlocutor—who is off-stage, as well as unknown
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to the confederate, and whose voice was previously recorded—intervenes (through headphones) from
time to time to locate objects on the screen with his own original names as well. This much conforms to
prior studies. Meanwhile, participants’ eye movements are recorded, in the context of the Visual World
Paradigm, in order to reveal real-time language processing (for a review of this paradigm, see Huettig
et al. [27]). The innovation here is twofold. The first concerns participants’ beliefs about the situation:
participants are led to believe that the interlocutor is viewing just two objects while the participant is
viewing three. Therefore, one of the three objects on the participant’s display is an ‘extra’ object that is
not seen by the speaker; moreover, the listener does not know in advance which object it is. Additionally,
the speaker thinks that the participant sees the same two objects he sees. This becomes important when
the participant has to reason through the speaker’s critical test sentence.
The second innovation is that the critical test sentence uses negation. We introduced negation because,
while its basic meaning is to deny propositions, it can lead a listener to carry out a search for alternatives
[28] (for a discussion, see Noveck [29]). As Oaksford [30] has argued, negations prompt a listener
to construct a contrast class. In the current experiment, it is our expectation that negative referential
expressions such as ‘not the jellyfish’ will lead the listener to choose one item—as the speaker’s intended
item—from the contrast class of two non-jellyfish items on a screen. We would like to determine the
moment that common ground considerations figure into the search for what the listener takes to be the
intended item. We elaborate directly below.
To return to the experimental scenario, when the listener—who on past trials has associated the label
jellyfish with one of three objects—processes the utterance ‘not the jellyfish’, it leaves her in a position to
choose among two remaining ones. In the event that the jellyfish-like object is the only referent of three to
have been named by the live confederate speaker, participants are obliged to choose randomly between
the other two (this is the one speaker–one precedent condition). In the event that the live confederate speaker
had also provided a name to a second item, for example, one that looks like a statue as ‘the statue’,
we hypothesized that the participant would use the negative utterance to click on the one remaining
unnamed object because listeners should prefer alternatives that are completely new (this is the one
speaker–two precedents condition). These two conditions set up baselines for the critical test condition in
which the live confederate speaker had, for example, coined jellyfish earlier while the other speaker
(unbeknownst to the confederate) had provided a name to another of the two remaining items, ‘the
statue’ in this case. This is the two speakers–two precedents condition.
The main question behind this research is the following: Do participants’ reactions in the critical two
speakers–two precedents condition resemble those in the one speaker–one precedent condition or do
they resemble those in the one speaker–two precedent condition? This could be further divided into
two parts. Do participants’ response patterns in the critical two speakers–two precedents condition
demonstrate that the listener immediately distinguishes the common ground established with the live
confederate speaker from that established with the off-stage voice? The other concerns the time course of
the eye-tracking data. Assuming that participants do take into consideration only the live confederate’s
perspective when she says ‘not the jellyfish’ (leading them to choose randomly between what are—
to the confederate—two unnamed objects), do their search patterns resemble those found in the one
speaker–one precedent condition or to those found in the one speaker–two precedents condition?
If participants’ responses and time course data in the two speakers–two precedents condition
resemble those in the one speaker–one precedent condition, this would be direct support for the strong
view [14,17]. This would indicate that participants are essentially ignoring the off-line exchange or are
keeping track of their two conceptual pacts with high fidelity. On the other hand, if the participants in
the critical two speakers–two precedents condition respond in a way that is similar to the one speaker–
two precedents condition this would be strong support for the linguistic processing view. But this
is not the only possible outcome that would lend support to the latter. Another possible outcome is
that participants (i) do incorporate the two precedents linguistically (without considering the common
ground of each) before they (ii) recognize downstream that the speaker could not have been aware that
the listener has a name for one of the remaining items. In that case, the time course of participants should
start off resembling those in the one speaker–two precedents condition and end up resembling those in
the one speaker–one precedent condition. This would indicate that considerations of common ground
do not emerge immediately.
1.3. The experiment
As will become clear, the experiment was divided into a series of rounds, each consisting of two
phases: a Grounding Phase that sets up precedents with certain speakers, followed by a Test Phase,
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the picture that looks like a jellyfish grounding phase
4 grounding trials (a,b,c,d)
+ 2 filler trials (e,f )
test phase
the picture that looks like a jellyfish
the picture that looks like a jellyfish
the jellyfish
the jellyfish
the jellyfish
the thing that looks like a ring
the thing that looks like a statue
the thing that looks like a statue
the ring
the statue
the statue
the eggs
the eggs
the eggs
the ring
the ring
the ring
the ring
the ring
the ring
not the jellyfish
not the jellyfish
not the jellyfish
the eggs
the eggs
the eggs
2 filler trials (g,h)
+ test trial ( i)
(b)
(a)
(c)
(d )
(e)
(g)
(h)
(i)
( f )
Figure 1. Schematic of a round. Each round consisted of nine trials (from a–i). Each trial consisted on one display with three objects and
an instruction. One round was divided into a grounding phase with six trials (a–f ) and a test phase with three trials (g–i). Next to the
letter identifying each trial are the instructions given by the speakers for each condition: the first one, in blue, is the one speaker–one
precedent condition; the secondone, ingreen, is theone speaker–twoprecedents condition; the third one, in red, is the two speakers–two
precedents condition. Instructions given by the remote speaker are italicized. The test trial is indicated by the letter ‘i’.
which contained the test trial. We measured listeners’ eye movements and observed their referential
choice as they listened to speech from the live speaker. All of the objects used in the displays were
unusual and lacked conventional names. Figure 1 depicts a round and figure 2 is an example of a
test trial.
The test trial provided the data to test our hypotheses. As can be seen in figure 2 (which corresponds
to trial i in figure 1), a test trial included three alternative referents that varied with respect to their status
in the discourse. The negated alternative (e.g. the jellyfish) was a named object that would be referred to
through a negation. The unmentioned alternative is an object that had never been named by anyone in
the discourse. Finally, there is the critical alternative, whose labelling varies across the three conditions.
Whereas it is named previously by the confederate speaker in the one speaker–two precedents condition
and named by the remote speaker in the two speakers–two precedents condition, it is not named at all in
the one speaker–one precedent condition.
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unmentioned
critical
negated
“... not the jellyfish”
Figure 2. Example of test trial. The picture at the lower left side of the display is the negated alternative, which has been mentioned
before twice by the live speaker in the grounding phase (trials a and b). The picture in the upper part is the unmentioned alternative,
that has never been named. Finally, the picture on the lower right side is the critical alternative; what has happened to it in trials c and d
during the grounding phase configured the different conditions. In the one speaker–one precedent was not named; in the one speaker–
two precedents was named by the live speaker; and in the two speakers–two precedents was named only to the listener by the remote
speaker through the headphones she was wearing.
2. Material and methods
2.1. Participants
Twenty-four undergraduates (13 females and 11 males; mean age= 22), who were all native speakers of
Spanish, participated in exchange for 5000 Chilean Pesos (approx. 10 USD). Each participant received one
of three stimulus lists created by rotating each item through all three conditions so that each participant
saw a third of the items in each of the three conditions.
2.2. Design
The experiment had a one factor design with three conditions that differed as a function of the critical
alternative. As is shown in figure 1, in the one speaker–one precedent condition, a filler object, not
appearing on the test trial (i), was named in the grounding trials (c and d) by the live speaker as ‘the ring’,
leaving the critical alternative unnamed; in the one speaker–two precedents condition, the live speaker
named the critical alternative (the statue) in those same grounding trials; and in the two speakers–two
precedents condition, the remote speaker (in italics) named the critical alternative, also in trials c and d.
2.3. Procedure
Upon arriving at the laboratory, the experimenter described the entire scenario and the task to both
interlocutors before the actual roles of speaker (for the confederate) and listener (for the naive participant)
were assigned. They were shown how the speaker and listener worked from different computer screens
and that the two were prevented from viewing each other’s screen. They were told that the task was for
the listener to follow the instructions of the speaker on which object, out of two alternatives, to select.
Participants were led to believe (and also, to believe that the confederate co-participant also believed)
the following details about the procedure: (i) that on some trials the instructions would be given by
a remote speaker; (ii) that these instructions were transmitted through headphones so that only the
listener could hear them; (iii) that this remote speaker was a previous participant in the experiment
whose instructions were recorded; and (iv) that while the listeners heard instructions from the remote
speaker, the participant playing the role of speaker would see a blank screen and would not be able to
hear the instruction. Up to this point, participants were also given the impression that the same two
objects would appear on both screens.
The next step was to assign the roles of speaker and listener to the participant and the confederate. In
order to provide the impression of random assignment, the confederate and the participant drew slips of
paper on which a single role was assigned. In fact, the drawing was rigged so that the participant would
get the role of listener (both slips of paper were marked with the word ‘listener’) and the confederate
announced that (s)he had drawn the role of speaker. Then, both sat in their places. The eye-tracking
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participant
confederate
“not the jellyfish”
L LS
LS
L
  not the jellyfish
Figure 3. The experimental situation. The participant plays the role of listener (L) and a confederate the role of live speaker (LS). They
cannot see each other’s screen. On the listener’s screen three objects appear; he believes that on the speaker’s screen there are only two of
these objects, not knowingwhich ones, and that the speaker believes that the same two pictures appear on his screen. In fact, the speaker
is seeing the instructions she has to give. The listener is wearing headphones from which the instructions from the remote speaker are
given only to him.
camera was placed in between the listener and his screen and, similarly, the microphone was placed
between the confederate speaker and her screen through which she provided the instructions. Listeners
wore headphones through which they heard—privately—the remote speaker instructions. Listeners
selected (what they thought was) the intended object with the computer mouse. Figure 3 shows the
experimental setting.
Before the task began, only the listener was told that he would actually see three alternatives, the
two that appeared in the speaker’s screen plus one more. Thus, listeners knew that speakers saw only
two of the three alternatives, but did not know in advance which two. Importantly, the listener was led
to believe that the speaker was unaware of any discrepancy between the displays. Now, the listener had
another task—besides following the instructions from the speaker—which was to try to guess which
was the object not appearing on the speaker’s screen. With this additional feature of the cover story,
we were able to generate a situation with referential ambiguity that allowed us to test our hypotheses:
an instruction with a negation that rules out one alternative but leaves other two. Also, because the
listener believed that the speaker was unaware of the discrepancy between their displays, there was
no perception of uncooperative behaviour due to the ambiguity in the speaker’s instructions. (Figure 3
depicts this situation.)
Figure 1 shows a schematic depiction of the task. For the sake of clarity, we will consider a single ‘trial’
an event in which the listener views a display and interprets a speaker’s instruction to click on one of the
objects. When we refer to a ‘round’, it is a collection of trials that includes the test trial, which was among
the three last trials. The experiment had a total of 18 rounds, one for each experimental item.
The trials comprising a round can be subdivided into two ‘phases’: the grounding phase which
consists of four trials that set up the names for the test trial objects (a,b,c,d) and two filler trials that serve
to mask the real purpose of the grounding phase (e,f ). The test phase contains the test trial (i) along with
two filler trials (g,h). The trials were randomized with two restrictions: that the grounding phase always
happened before the test phase, and that the trials in the grounding phase that introduced the name for
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an object (a,c,e), which usually had a heading of the sort ‘The picture that looks like a jellyfish’, always
occurred before the trials that re-used that name without the heading (b,d,f ). All behavioural measures
(target selection and eye gaze data) were drawn from the test trials. In each test trial, the speaker used a
negated referring expression, such as ‘not the jellyfish’ (‘no la medusa’ in Spanish), to indirectly identify
the target.
As mentioned above, listeners saw three referential alternatives in the test trials: the negated alternative,
the unmentioned alternative and the critical alternative (figure 2). The pictures associated with each
of these alternatives had appeared with equal frequency in the trials preceding the test trial, with
the unmentioned alternative seen but never named. Again, as outlined above, the three conditions
were formed by either ignoring the critical alternative (much like the unmentioned alternative) or by
manipulating who described the critical alternative (the confederate or the remote speaker).
In the two speakers–two precedents condition, the listener heard pre-recorded instructions while
the confederate speaker presumably viewed a blank screen. To equate the number of pre-recorded
instructions given to listeners across conditions, such instructions were given in the filler trials in the
two other conditions (trials e and f ).
2.4. Materials and apparatus
For each of the 18 experimental items, there were pictures of six different unconventional objects: one for
the negated alternative, one for the unmentioned alternative, one for the critical alternative, plus three
different filler objects. These were downloaded from the internet and were presented in greyscale so that
they could not be identified using colour.
We tracked listeners’ eye movements using an EyeLink 1000 eyetracker (SR Research). The system
used a remote tabletop camera, allowing relatively free head movement. Gaze data were recorded at a
sampling rate of 500 Hz.
2.5. Data analysis
All analyses were performed and all the graphics created through R [31]. Our analysis considered both
selection data (i.e. what the listener chose to click on) and eye-tracking data. For the selection data, we
analysed the likelihood of choosing the unnamed alternative (a binary variable) using linear mixed-
models with crossed random effects for subjects and items [32]. Because these data were categorical,
we used a generalized linear mixed model with a binomial variance function and logit link. We tested
all effects using model comparison, comparing models with identical random effects but with the fixed
effect(s) of interest removed from one of the models. All models included the maximal random effects
structure justified by the design [33]: by-subject and by-item random intercepts, as well as by-subject
and by-item random slopes for each of the two variables used to code the three levels of the condition
variable. These analyses were performed using the R add-on package lme4, v. 0.999999-2 [31].
Visual-world eye data are more difficult to analyse, because one needs to conduct a time-series
analysis on a large dataset that accounts for temporal dependencies due to repeated sampling as
well as for dependencies introduced by the experimental design. To overcome these challenges, we
performed all analyses of the eye data using resampling techniques: specifically, bootstrapping to obtain
confidence limits and an adapted version of the cluster randomization approach that is commonly used
to analyse complex datasets in neuroimaging [34,35]. In adapting the approach for visual-world data, we
followed Barr et al. [36]. Here, we provide an overview of the approach. Technical details are available in
appendix A.
As our hypothesis concerned when certain effects emerge in our data, we wanted to use an approach
that could localize events in time without the arbitrariness of the bin-by-bin analyses that are customarily
used in visual-world research. In such analyses, there is usually no principled way to choose the size of
each temporal bin in which effects are to be compared. Furthermore, researchers who use such analyses
rarely correct for the additional familywise error introduced by conducting multiple comparisons. By
contrast, the cluster randomization approach as applied to visual-world data avoids the problem of
multiple comparisons, through the use of a single second-order test statistic known as a cluster mass
statistic [34].
The basic logic is as follows. Multiple inferential tests are performed at each frame of eye-tracking
data, and ‘clusters’ are identified as consecutive data frames in which all effects (i) are all significant
at some specified alpha-level (usually 0.05), and (ii) are all in the same direction. In other words, any
‘run’ of consecutive frames that all show significant effects in the same direction constitutes a single
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‘cluster’. The individual test statistics for each frame within a cluster are summed together to create a
single second-order statistic for that cluster, the cluster mass statistic. The condition labels for the data are
then shuffled according to some permutation logic and then the process is repeated on the transformed
data. The permutation/analysis cycle is repeated a large number of times and the distribution of cluster
mass statistics over the transformed data sets provides a null-hypothesis distribution for the cluster mass
statistics on the clusters detected in the original data.
Because we were interested in generalizing over subjects and items, we performed separate cluster
randomization analyses, one treating subjects as random factors and another treating items as random
factors. Separate analyses were necessary because it is not clear within a resampling approach how to
simultaneously generalize to both subject and item populations. We report the p-values for these analyses
as p1 and p2 for subjects and items, respectively.
3. Results
3.1. Selection data
Table 1 shows the percentage of selections for each alternative in the three conditions. If one assumes
that listeners incorporate common ground comprehensively (and that they use negations to search for
alternatives), one ought to predict that participants will select the unmentioned alternative reliably in the
one speaker–two precedents condition only; the two other conditions—the two speakers–two precedents
condition and the one speaker–one precedent condition—ought to be similar and show that participants
choose randomly from the two choices.
The mixed-model analysis of the rate of unmentioned objects selection revealed a significant main
effect of Condition (χ2 (2)= 17.80, p= 0.0001). Listeners selected the unmentioned alternative at a
higher rate in the one speaker–two precedents condition (80.6%) than in the one speaker–one precedent
(50.0%), (χ2 (1)= 13.38, p= 0.0003). The selection rate of the unmentioned object in the two speakers–
two precedents condition (56.2%) was similar to that of the one speaker–one precedent condition (50.0%)
(χ2 (1)= 0.43, p= 0.5104). Thus, at the end of the interpretation process, it appears that participants made
their referential commitment by considering common ground information. That is, they realized that
they need to consider that the critical object was named by the remote speaker in the two speakers–two
precedents condition, so that when the live speaker says ‘not the jellyfish’, the listener is ultimately aware
that speaker did not name the critical object.
3.2. Eye data
We now turn to the eye-tracking data in order to determine the extent to which we can isolate linguistic
decoding processes in this task (i.e. independently of common ground considerations). We measure eye
gaze to the three test-display objects at the offset of the negated expression (e.g. the end of the word
‘jellyfish’ in ‘not the jellyfish’). We used the offset because we assumed that listeners would begin by
gazing at the negated object. If common ground is processed in parallel with the linguistic information
in this task, gazing at the unnamed alternative in the two speakers–two precedents condition should
resemble gazing at the unnamed alternative in the one speaker–one precedent condition because, in
both cases, negated utterances such as ‘not the jellyfish’ leave open two possible reference assignments,
including the unnamed alternative. On the other hand, if reference assignment is guided solely by
the linguistic input (at least initially), gazing at the unmentioned alternative in the two speakers–two
precedents condition ought to resemble gazing at the unmentioned alternative in the one speaker–two
precedents condition because, in both cases, the listener has internalized a name for the two precedents
(and without considering who assigned the names).
Figure 4 shows the proportion of time spent looking at each object for each condition between
0 and 2.5 s after the offset of the negated referring expression. As expected, listeners in the one
speaker–one precedent condition show clear signs of being unable to decide between the two unnamed
alternatives (the unmentioned and critical alternative). By contrast, in the one speaker–two precedents
condition, listeners appear to look away from the negated alternative by about 200 ms and form a
complement set consisting of the two remaining alternatives. From about 500 ms onward in the one
speaker–two precedents condition, listeners show increased looks to the unmentioned alternative. These
two conditions provide us with guideposts with which to appreciate gazing behaviour of the two
speakers–two precedents condition.
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Figure 4. Proportion of time gazing at referential alternatives by condition. Points and lines are observed data; shaded regions represent
95% confidence intervals derived by bootstrapping subjects.
Table 1. Selection rate per alternative per condition.
alternative
condition unmentioned (%) critical (%) negated (%)
one speaker–one precedent 50.0 49.3 0.7
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
one speaker–two precedents 80.6 16.0 3.5
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
two speakers–two precedents 56.2 43.1 0.7
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The two speakers–two precedents condition initially resembles the one speaker–two precedents
condition; indeed, these two conditions look remarkably similar until 1000 ms, after which looks to the
unmentioned alternative seem to grow at a faster rate in the one speaker–two precedents condition.
The overall pattern is consistent with an account in which eye gaze is guided, at least initially, by
linguistic decoding.
These informal observations were supported by statistical analyses. We performed cluster
randomization analyses on the log ratio of looks to the unmentioned versus the critical alternative
because this pair of objects affords the clearest and most direct test of the hypotheses. The log ratio
was derived from a baseline-category multinomial logit model fit to the data [37]. The log ratio is zero
when there is equal preference for the two objects and is increasingly positive as preference for the
unmentioned alternative increases. Likewise, if listeners prefer the critical alternative, the log ratio will
become increasingly negative. Thus, to the extent listeners make common ground-based interpretations,
the log ratio should be highest in the one speaker–two precedents condition.
The log ratio data and confidence intervals are shown in figure 5. It is clear from this plot that between
500 and 1100 ms, preference for the unmentioned over the critical alternative diverged from the one
speaker–one precedent condition and grew at similar rates regardless of whether the naming of the
critical alternative was in common ground. A cluster randomization analysis comparing the average
of the two speakers–two precedents and one speaker–two precedents conditions to the one speaker–
one precedent condition detected a significant cluster (p1= 0.004, p2 < 0.001) beginning at about 900 ms
and continuing until the end of the analysis window (2500 ms). By contrast, the effect of common
ground (difference between the one speaker–two precedents and the two speakers–two precedents
conditions) did not emerge until about 500 ms later (p1= 0.004, p2 < 0.001), starting at about 1600 ms
and lasting until the end of the analysis window. This considerable delay between the onset of these two
effects is consistent with the hypothesis that interpretation initially relies on the linguistic input before
considerations of common ground come into play in the two speakers–two precedents condition.
In summary, early and momentary referential commitments, as judged by analyses of eye gaze, do
not show the same pattern as late commitments and final referential assignments. Initial referential
interpretation seems to be driven by the linguistic input while considerations raised by common ground
emerge close to a half-second later. In this task, listeners appear to build upon the linguistic input in
order to ultimately select the most pragmatically appropriate target.
 on April 25, 2017http://rsos.royalsocietypublishing.org/Downloaded from 
11
rsos.royalsocietypublishing.org
R.Soc.opensci.4:160827
................................................
one speaker, one precedent
one speaker, two precedents
two speakers, two precedents
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500
time from expression offset (ms)
0
2
4
lo
g 
ra
tio
Figure 5. Log ratio by condition. Shaded regions represent 95% confidence intervals derived by bootstrapping subjects.
4. General discussion
Reference resolution is a quintessential pragmatic phenomenon. As such, an utterance’s linguistically
encoded meaning ought to underdetermine its intended meaning and the output of linguistic decoding
ought to interact with some form of common ground. The debate in the reference literature basically
concerns the interaction. One dominating position has long been that common ground permeates the
linguistic interpretation of an utterance from its earliest moments [7,8,14,17,21,24,25]. The other position
is that, while intention reading is ultimately essential, it is not necessarily the directing force from the
start. Linguistic decoding that does not fully take into account common ground can also be a source of
interpretation, at least early on in sentence processing [10,16,18,23].
In this study, we tested the predictions from the two schools of thought as we aimed to determine
the role and timing with which common ground comes into play when resolving reference in a scenario
that has one or two precedents (established by up to two speakers). We introduced negation into the
paradigm because it prompts a search for alternatives and we were interested in determining whether
the listener’s search would distinguish between alternatives based on the common ground with the
speaker. By examining listeners’ selection choices, we could confirm that they ultimately do rely on
common ground. Through eye-tracking measures, we found evidence indicating that participants’ initial
interpretations are most likely driven by linguistic decoding, i.e. listeners do not rely on common ground
in the early going.
How do these results fit into the literature on reference and common ground? As we indicated earlier,
the traditional position proposes that common ground is the intrinsic context for comprehension [8].
It follows then that the current findings are inconsistent with this view as listeners’ eye-gazes suggest
that referential search is independent of common ground up to 1000 ms after the offset of the referential
utterance. By no means do we want to claim that common ground is not vital to comprehension. While
we assume that listeners rely on common ground for comprehension, we only show that access to
common ground is not immediate in the current, challenging paradigm.
These delayed effects of common ground also make our findings inconsistent with another approach
that posits common ground is one of many cues combined immediately and simultaneously as part of a
probabilistic constraint satisfaction process [14,17,21,24,25]. If common ground immediately constrained
language processing on this task, the effect of common ground should have emerged no later than
the earliest evidence for effects of referential processing. However, as we indicated earlier, there is
no apparent difference between the one speaker–two precedents condition and the two speakers–two
precedents condition until about 1000 ms, well after the gaze probability for the unmentioned alternative
had already diverged from the one speaker–one precedent condition (about 500–1000 ms).
Our use of negation also makes a stronger case against constraint-based approaches than was possible
in previous studies of referential precedents that used positive descriptions [16]. Unlike with non-
negated expressions, effects of common ground do not have to fight against other effects of linguistic
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processing to be seen: the choice is guided entirely by the pragmatics of the situation. For instance,
when a speaker re-uses an expression to refer to a target, common ground predicts that looks to the
target should be faster and more when a conceptual pact exists with that speaker. However, when that
description happens to also fit the target well independently of the previous discourse record, then
looks to the target will be high anyway, making it more difficult to detect effects of common ground.
For negated expressions, the semantics are used only to exclude an alternative from the set of possible
referents, and thus the choice among the remaining set must be done on the basis of pragmatics alone,
improving the chances for detecting effects of common ground.
The results are consistent with the idea that listeners begin interpreting referential utterance without
the features of common ground (speaker-related labels) fully worked-out or registered. In this study’s
relatively complex task, we were able to isolate (the inevitable arrival of) common ground from linguistic
processing. Until common ground considerations were taken up, the paradigm revealed that, for
a full second, the listener’s interpretation of ‘not the jellyfish’ in the two speakers–two precedents
condition is processed as if the critical alternative has a name but without considering who had
coined it. Indeed, participants in this task look away from objects that have a name, no matter who
gave it.
Now we turn to several potential criticisms. The first concerns the use of negation, which is among
the most difficult linguistic connectives to process. Psycholinguistic studies have shown how negations
are effortful and a potential source of confusion [38]. The criticism is that perhaps a negative utterance in
itself can generate a search for alternatives that is so overwhelming that it has the potential to undermine
the attribution of common-ground related features. Our response to this potential critique is that any
claims on the priority of negation-generating searches would only support the view that says that a
linguistically generated process is a critical feature in this task, one that prevents common ground
from gaining traction. Moreover, if negation had a general effect, the eye-tracking data from the one
speaker–one precedent condition would look more similar to those in the other two, at least during the
first 1000 ms. A related criticism is that perhaps this task underestimates effects of common ground,
because the inferences required in this situation are unusually complex. This might seem especially
compelling given claims from other research for immediate effects of common ground [17,24,26]. We
cannot rule out this possibility, but also note that delayed effects of common ground also appear in the
broken precedent case [19], where the inferences are much simpler. An important agenda for the field
is to resolve whether these discrepancies in time-course reflect variation in the difficulty of inference,
different levels of interactivity in the communicative situation [25] or methodological and analytical
confounding [37].
A more global criticism concerns particular details of our experiment. Here, we focus on two features:
(i) that we had a relatively small sample of 24 participants and (ii) that we used a speaker who was
recorded. In response to the sample size, we point out that our results are rather consistent across
subjects. For example, 19 out of 24 participants provide the same pattern in the way they ultimately
rely on common ground to make their last referential commitment (see Results section). Additionally,
it should be noted that there were multiple trials in each condition for each participant, and that the
experiment used a within-participant design. The fact that common ground effects eventually appeared
shows that it was adequately powered to detect such effects. We also point out that eye-tracking studies
generally have a small number of participants, primarily due to the logistic demands that arise when
running such experiments.
With respect to the other methodological concern (that we rely on one speaker who is recorded),
we make three points. First, listeners do engage with the speaker in making common ground decisions,
which is fully evidenced in their referential selections. Second, and more importantly, the main features of
the task are generally natural and interactive with both speakers. For example, precedents are grounded
collaboratively with the live speaker. And with the remote speaker’s recorded instructions, they received
audio feedback informing them whether their selection was correct or incorrect. Besides, the critical
instruction, from which we collected the data, was always given by the live speaker. Finally, participants
never questioned the idea that the second speaker was a real participant.
To summarize, this study examining the use of referential precedents in the processing of negated
expressions revealed strong evidence that early interpretation processes are guided by linguistic
considerations, and that effects of common ground are not immediate. Negated expressions provide
a promising testing ground for theories of perspective taking in language comprehension by allowing
greater isolation of pragmatic effects from linguistic effects. It is not the case that non-negated
expressions are the best way to resolve controversies in the literature on perspective taking in
language comprehension.
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Appendix A. Resampling approach for eye-data analysis
The cluster randomization approach is a popular solution in neuroimaging for analyses involving
multiple tests at distinct locations and/or time points [34,35] (for prior adaptation of the solution to
the analysis of visual world data, see [36]). This approach corrects for multiple comparisons by taking
advantage of temporal correlations between subsequent observations. The logic is as follows. First, at
each time point, a test is performed at a specified α level. Clusters are then identified by grouping
together subsequent frames in which all effects are all significant and all are in the same direction. Once
the clusters have been identified, a ‘cluster mass statistic’ is calculated for each cluster; usually the sum
of all of the individual test statistics can be obtained by randomization (permutation tests). In particular,
new versions of the dataset are created by shuffling condition labels according to some permutation
scheme. Then, tests are performed on each of these newly created datasets as described above, and
the maximum cluster mass statistic is identified. The vector of these statistics forms a null-hypothesis
distribution for the original statistic.
We performed two cluster randomization analyses on the log ratio data, one to compare the average
of the one speaker–two precedents and two speakers–two precedents conditions to one speaker–one
precedent, and a second to compare the one speaker–two precedents and two speakers–two precedents
conditions. The data were first divided into 50 ms time bins (25 samples of eye data). Log ratios were
calculated for each bin by fitting a baseline-category multinomial logistic regression to the data [40],
with the critical alternative as baseline. The log ratio of unmentioned to critical was the primary-
dependent variable. The permutation scheme for the comparison to control was as follows. For each
subject, we made a random decision whether to keep the original labelling for that subject, or whether
to swap the condition labels. In the latter case, the condition labels for the three conditions would
be swapped en masse for that subject; e.g. one speaker–two precedents would be replaced with two
speakers–two precedents, two speakers–two precedents with one speaker–one precedent, and one
speaker–one precedent with one speaker–two precedents. The permutation scheme for the comparison
between one speaker–two precedents and two speakers–two precedents was similar, except the one
speaker–one precedent condition labels remained fixed, and the decision for each subject was whether
to keep or exchange the labels for the one speaker–two precedents and two speakers–two precedents
conditions.
For each analysis, we created 9999 alternative versions of the dataset following the permutation
scheme. For a given dataset, the p-values were determined by comparing the log ratio for that dataset
to the distribution comprised by all other datasets. Each p-value was then converted into a test statistic
T using the formula T=− log(p) [36]; with this negative log transformation, the smaller the p-value, the
larger the test statistic. All T values greater than − log(0.05) were classified as significant, clusters were
identified and a cluster mass statistic calculated for each cluster, which was the sum of all T values for
that cluster.
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